Doris Starzel and State of Utah v. Johnny Jaramillo : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Doris Starzel and State of Utah v. Johnny Jaramillo :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Phil L. Hansen; Hansen and Hansen; Attorneys for Appellant;
David L. Wilkinson; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Starzel v. Jaramillo, No. 18374 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3085
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS STARZEL and 
STATE OF UTAH, by 
and through Off ice of 
Recovery Services, 
State Department of 
Social Services, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-v-
JOHNNY JARAMILLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18374 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
Carbon County, State of Utah 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTOR...~EY ~ENF.RAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Resnondents 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
HANSEN AND F..ANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attornevs for Appellant 
FILED 
JUL ;: ~ 1982 
..................................... ". 
Clari. su,,~r.itt Court, ~u;~~-··---
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS STARZEL and 
STATE OF UTAH, by 
and through Off ice of 
Recovery Services, 
State Department of 
Social Services, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-v-
JOHNNY JARAMILLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18374 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court 
Carbon County, State of Utah 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTOR...~EY ~ENF.RAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Resnondents 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attornevs for A?pellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ............................. 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ................................ 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
SET ASIDE IN FAVOR OF A DECISION 
ON THE MERI TS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
POINT II THE ADVANTAGE OF RES JUDICATA IS 
OUTWEIGHED BY THE BENEFITS OF A 
HEARING ON THE MERITS .................. 7 
CONCLUSION • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
CASES CITED 
Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 
384 P. 2d 806 (1963) ............................... . 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (1956) .............. . 
Cutler v. Haycock, 90 P. 897 (1907) .................... . 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979) .................... . 
Heathman v. Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (1962) .. . 
Hurd v. Ford , 2 7 6 P . 9 0 8 ( 19 2 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 (1962) ... 
01 sen v . Cummings , 5 6 5 P . 2 d 112 3 ( 19 7 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . 
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033 
(1890) ............................................. . 
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Cor . v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 
70 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P.2d 741 (1959) ............. . 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953) ......... . 
1 Co. v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-i-
10 
5 6 
' 
5,7 
9 
5 
4 
9 
4,6 
6 
4,5,9 
4 
9 
7,8 
6,10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953).......................... 4 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ................... 4 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ............... 2 
Rule 60(b)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ............ 3,4,5,6 
-ii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPRE1'1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS STARZEL and 
STATE OF UTAH, by 
and through Off ice of 
Recovery Services, 
State Department of 
Social Services, 
. 
. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-v-
JOHNNY JARAMILLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18374 
The above-captioned· action was brought against the 
appellant by Doris Starzel and State of Utah to determine if the 
appellant was the natural father of respondent's child, Chad 
Starzel, born August 20, 1977. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 26, 1982, respondents moved to have the 
appellant's answer to the complaint set aside for failure to 
answer interrogatories. The court struck said answer on the 
failure of both the appellant and counsel to appear. Appellant, 
by and through new counsel, filed a motion to set aside default 
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judgment which was subsequently denied by the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell on April 19, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
denying the motion to set aside judgment and the right to have a 
trial upon the merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This suit was initiated in December of 1980. The 
respondents' first set of interrogatories was filed with the court 
May 18, 1981. The appellant failed to answer said interrogatories 
within the thirty (30) day time limit imposed by Rule 33(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Subsequently, Deputy Carbon 
County Attorney Gene Strate wrote to Walter R. Ellett, former 
attorney for appellant, and requested the answers to interrogatories. 
On September 23, 1981, Mr. Ellett responded by letter and advised 
the County Attorney that he would be meeting with the appellant 
personally to obtain the answers. Apparently, Mr. Ellett failed 
to do so, which prompted Fred Howard, Deputy Carbon County Attorney, 
to file a Motion to Compel Discovery. The court granted said 
motion on November 30, 1981, giving the appellant ten (10) days to 
comply. On January 26, 1982, respondents moved the court to set 
aside appellant's answer to the complaint for failure to comply 
with said order compelling discovery. A hearing on this motion 
was set for February 23, 1982. Neither the aooellant nor his 
. ~ 
counsel appeared at said hearing. On February 26, 1982, the court 
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ordered the appellant's answer stricken. On March 11, 1982, a 
default judgment was entered, wherein the appellant was adjudged 
to be the natural father of the child in question. The court 
retained jurisdiction to determine the amount of child support. 
On March 14, 1982, the appellant was personally served with an 
Order to Show Cause requiring him to appear before the court for 
the purpose of determining his ability to pay child support. 
The following day, March 15, 1982, the appellant met with his 
present counsel, Phil L. Hansen, for the first time. On March 23, 
1982, said counsel filed a motion to have the default judgment 
set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This motion was heard on April 5, 1982, and the order 
denying same was entered on April 19, 1982. Notice of Appeal was 
filed by appellant on May 14, 1982. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
IN FAVOR OF A DECISION ON THE MERITS. 
Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment 
was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which reads as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the-furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect .... The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken ... '' 
-3-
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It is well settled that the rules of civil procedure 
are to be liberally construed with a view to promote justice. 
Rule l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 68-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). In this regard, then Justice Crockett in Utah Sand & 
Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (1965) stated: 
"It is true that our new rules of civil 
procedure were intended to eliminate undue 
and emphasis on technicalities and to 
provide liberality in procedure to the end 
that disputes be heard and determined on 
the merits .... Liberality in their 
interpretation and application should be 
indulged where no prejudice or disadvantage 
to anyone results ... " 
This statutory and judicial policy of liberality has been 
especially evident in those decisions in which the interpretation 
of Rule 60(b) has arisen in the context of a default judgment. 
From the earliest decisions of this court, it has been emphasized 
that default judgments are viewed with suspicion and that the 
authority of the trial court to set aside judgments obtained by 
default is to be liberally applied so that there might be a 
decision on the merits. Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trtllllbo, 
53 P. 1033 (1890). This suspicion and disfavor arises from the 
recognition that it is a harsh and oppressive action to place a 
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing and 
that it is fundamental to our system of justice that each party 
to a controversy be given an opportunity to present his side of 
the controversy. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 
(1962). Illustrative is the following language from Heathman v. 
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Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (1962): 
"Judgments by default are not favored 
by the courts nor are they in the interest 
of justice and fair play. No one has an 
inalienable or constitutional right to a 
judgment by default without a hearing on 
the merits. The courts, in the interest 
of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of every case ... " 
Rule 60(b) and its statutory predecessors1 are of long 
standing and have been construed by this court on numerous 
occasions. These decisions have uniformly embraced several 
general propositions, the first of which is that the trial court's 
determination involving a motion to set aside a default judgment 
is largely a discretionary matter, and as a concomitant, that 
this court will reverse such a determination only in the event of 
an abuse of that discretion. For example, see Board of Education 
of Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). Although 
it is true that no general rule can be promulgated respecting 
the exercise of discretion in setting aside or refusing to set aside 
a default judgment since each case must necessarily turn on its 
own peculiar facts and circtllllstances, Trtllllbo, supra; Heath v. 
Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979). This court has, however, been careful 
to define the scope of that discretion, and has by no means given 
the trial courts a free hand to refuse to set aside default 
judgments. Thus, in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (1956) 
1 Comp. Laws, 1876, § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005; Com~. Laws, 
1917, §6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. 
-5-
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then Justice Crockett, writing for a unanimous court, stated: 
"We are entirelv in accord with the 
authorities cited by plaintiff to the 
effect that it is generally regarded 
as an abuse of discretion for a trial 
court to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where timely application is 
made and there is any reasonable grounds 
for doing so, to the end that cases may 
be decided on their merits." 
This two-pronged requirement of timeliness and reasonable justi-
fication has been subsequently cited with approval in many 
decisions. Mayhew, supra; Board of Education, supra; Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (1975); and Olsen v. 
Cunnnings, 565 P.2d 1123 (1977). 
That the motion was timely is clear. Rule 60(b) imnoses 
a three (3) month time limitation on a motion to set aside due to 
neglect. The day after petitioner was served personally with the 
Order to Show Cause he met with present counsel who filed a motion 
to set aside in five (5) days, clearly within the statutory time 
·' limit. 
Appellant also presents a reasonable justification for 
setting aside the default judgment. The fact that appellant has 
properly and timely prosecuted this appeal demonstrates a deep, 
personal resolve of his innocence and a desire to have the facts 
presented and decided on their merits. Ap~ellant should not be 
judged by his former counsel's apparent neglect in getting answers 
to the interrogatories, especially in light of the fact that 
present counsel has secured the requested answers to the interrog-
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atories and is prepared to prosecute the case with due diligence. 
Present counsel feels it is inappropriate to emphasize the acts 
of prior counsel as an excuse for any delays, and would rather 
emphasize the pursuit with which present counsel has handled the 
case on appeal and suggest that these actions should be examined 
in deciding whether the case ought to be heard on the merits. 
Again, appellant stresses the words of Justice Crockett 
in Chrvsler, supra, that "where timely application is made and 
there is any reasonable grounds for doing so," cases should be 
decided on the merits. 
POINT II 
THE ADVANTAGE OF RES JUDICATA IS 
OUTWEIGHED BY THE BENEFITS OF A 
HEARING ON THE ~RITS. 
It is apparent that in exercising its discretion to set 
aside a default judgment the trial court is engaged in a balancing 
process between two valid considerationso Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953). In that case this court stated: 
"A rule which would permit the 
re-opening of cases previously 
decided because of error or 
ignorance during the progress of 
the trial would in large measure 
vitiate the effects of res judicata 
and create a hardship to the 
successful litigant in causing him 
to prosecute his action more than once 
and possibly lose the ability to 
collect his judgment; on the other 
hand, the court is anxious to 
protect the losing party who has 
not had the opportunity to present 
his claim or defense." 
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Thus, the court, in exercising its discretion to refuse to set 
aside a default judgment must weigh between the advantage of 
enforcing the effect of res judicata and the disadvantage of 
not conducting a hearing on the merits. While a contested action 
yields a judgment wherein the value of res judicata is greatest, 
a default judgment followed by a delayed appearance, as in the 
instant case, carries with it a very low value of finality, that 
is: 
"There has been no examination of 
the merits or, usually, matters of 
abatement such as the statute of 
limitations, and no substantial 
investment of judicial time and 
authority. At the same time, 
the appearance itself, even though 
delayed, indicates that the 
defaulting party wishes to contest 
the justness of the plaintiff's 
claim. Indeed, the only purpose 
the default has served is that 
of enforcing the rules concerning 
time appearance." 
Restatement, Second, Judgments, Tentative Draft No. 6, pg. 19. 
It appears that the concerns manifested by this court 
in Warren, supra, with respect to vacating judgments are outweighed 
by the benefits that would be bestowed by a hearing on the merits 
in the instant case. That is, the value of res judicata is low, 
since there has been a minimal investment of judicial time and 
authority and since respondent would not be substantially 
prejudiced by a setting aside of the default and a re-hearing 
on the merits. Respondent will not be prejudiced in her ability 
-8-
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to collect the judgment and any costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by respondent in taking the default judgment can be made 
a condition precedent to the setting aside of the judgment. 
Thus, respondent would in no way be prejudiced by a setting aside 
of the default judgment. Furthermore, it is well established 
that in all doubtful cases the court should resolve any doubt in 
the balancing process towards granting relief from the default 
judgment to bring about a trial on the merits. Cutler v. 
Haycock, 90 P. 897 (1907); Hurd v. Ford, 276 P. 908 (1929); 
Trumbo, supra. Additionally, the court in Cutler made the point 
that when a difference of opinion exists between the trial court 
and the appellate court as to whether a reasonable basis exists 
for setting aside the default judgment, then the judgment shall 
be set aside. 
" ... While as we have already stated, 
the mere difference of judgment between 
this court and the trial c curt may not 
be conclusive, still it raises a serious 
doubt, and in such a case a reasonable 
doubt is always resolved in favor of 
granting a trial upon the merits where 
none was had ... " 
It should not be forgotten that the allowance of a 
vacation of judgment is a creature of equity and the equity takes 
into consideration factors which may be irrelevant in actions 
at law, such as the unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay 
in bringing or continuing the action and the hardship in granting 
or denying relief. Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P.2d 741 (1959). 
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CONCLUSION 
The refusal of the lower court to set aside the default 
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion. Appellant did 
timely file his motion to set aside supp~Yrted by reasonable grounds. 
Disputed issues should be disposed of on substantive, rather 
than on technical grounds in the interest of justice and fair play. 
"It is indeed cormnendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them up to 
date. But it is even more important to 
keep in mind that the very reason for the 
existence of courts is to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice between them." 
Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Larsen, 544 f12d 876 (1975) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this {) l~ day of July, 1982. 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served this '?:le:;;;\ day of July, 1982, 
on the office of David L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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